PUBHLTH 405
Social Epidemiology of Infectious Disease
University of Michigan School of Public Health
Jon Zelner
[email protected]
epibayes.io
Chronicling the life-cycle of bad ideas
Wrapping up your contamination dossiers
Understanding the strong hold of Miasma theory
Miasmas of the Covid era and beyond
“Why was the miasma theory so persuasive? Why did so many brilliant minds cling to it, despite the mounting evidence that suggested it was false? This kind of question leads one to a kind of mirror-image version of intellectual history: not the history of breakthroughs and eureka moments, but instead the history of canards and false leads, the history of being wrong.” (Johnson 2007, 126)
[B]oth the long delays in replacing flawed, miasma-driven approaches to cholera prevention in the nineteenth century and long delays in replacing an exclusively contact-and-droplet model of SARS-CoV-2 prevention with one that includes airborne transmission in the twenty-first had a philosophical explanation in terms of which mental models of reality prevailed and the extent to which scientists and policymakers favoured data over theory. (Greenhalgh 2021)
With a partner:
What aspects of human biology and psychology made miasma a difficult idea to dispense with?
Which one of Rosenberg’s types of explanation did the miasmatists draw on to deal with the gaping logical holes 🧀 in miasma theory?
Which social prejudices were reinforced by miasma theory? Did these skew in one political direction or another?
“The miasma theory drew on other sources for its power as well. It was as much a crisis of imagination as it was pure optics. To build a case for waterborne cholera,the mind had to travel across scales of human experience, from the impossibly small—the invisible kingdom of microbes—to the anatomy of the digestive tract, to the routine daily patterns of drinking wells or paying the water-company bills, all the way up to the grand cycles of life and death recorded in the Weekly Returns.” (Johnson 2007, 131)
“Miasma was so much less complicated [than contagion]. You didn’t need to build a consilient chain of argument to make the case for miasma. You just needed to point to the air and say: Do you smell that?” (Johnson 2007, 132)
Miasma turns out to be a classic case of what Freud, in another context, called “overdetermination.” It was a theory that drew its persuasive power not from any single fact but rather from its location at the intersection of so many separate but compatible elements, like a network of isolated streams that suddenly converges to form a river. (Johnson 2007, 134)
As Sir Peter Medawar observed in his essay Induction and intuition in scientific thought, for example, scientists need to do more than ‘browse over the field of nature like cows at pasture’. This is because scientific reasoning is not merely the apprehension of facts but ‘an exploratory dialogue that can always be resolved into two voices: imaginative and critical’, hence ‘the initiative for scientific action comes not from the apprehension of facts but from an imaginative preconception of what might be true’. (Greenhalgh 2021)
In Medawar’s view, mental models and empirical data keep each other in check — he described them respectively as the ‘bride’ and ‘groom’ of science — and scientific progress in any discipline occurs by the back-and-forth dialogue between their two ‘voices’. (Greenhalgh 2021)
As described by the philosopher Daniel Dennett:
Intuition pumps are cunningly designed [thought experiments, which] focus the reader’s attention on “the important” features, and…deflect the reader from bogging down in hard-to-follow details. (Dennett and Crawford 2014)
It wasn’t really consistent with the available evidence, anyway.
Theories are underdetermined by data because many theories can explain the same dataset. So, consistency with one theory is not sufficient grounds to reject another.
What is evidence-based medicine, and what is Greenhalgh’s critique of its role in the COVID-19 pandemic?
What weaknesses does she highlight in the Danamask RCT?
What alternative sources of evidence does Greenhalgh argue should have been considered sooner in the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic?
What historical experiences might have accounted for the different response to SARS-CoV-2 in China as compared to the U.S.? Does this connect to John Snow’s experienced in any way?
Are there similar fallacies you can identify from having worked on your contamination dossiers?
Does this bias against certain types of evidence echo anything from The Ghost Map?
Relationship between voice volume and aerosol production (From Asadi et al. 2019)
What is meant by ‘risk of bias’?
Quality of evidence?
Where would Snow’s explorations fit in this hierarchy?
How could you re-draw this hierarchy to allow for more consilient explanations?